Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law
Volume 19

Issue 3

Article 4

2014

Blue Skies for America in the Securities Industry… Except for New
York: New York's Martin Act and the Private Right of Action
Adam J. Gana
Michael Villacres

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/jcfl

Recommended Citation
Adam J. Gana and Michael Villacres, Blue Skies for America in the Securities Industry… Except for New
York: New York's Martin Act and the Private Right of Action, 19 Fordham J. Corp. & Fin. L. 587 (2014).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/jcfl/vol19/iss3/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law by an authorized editor
of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact
tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.

Blue Skies for America in the Securities Industry… Except for New York: New
York's Martin Act and the Private Right of Action
Cover Page Footnote
Adam J. Gana is the managing partner of Gana LLP. His practice focuses on all aspects of securities
arbitration, complex commercial and business litigation, insurance litigation, employment law, class
actions, and appeals. Mr. Gana was named in the New York Super Lawyers Rising Stars® for four straight
years, ranked AV® Preeminent™ by Martindale-Hubbell™ (the highest honor offered), and ranked by the
National Trial Lawyers as one of the Top 100 attorneys in the State of New York. Michael Villacres is
currently enrolled in New York Law School, Class of 2014, with a focus on Securities and Corporate Law.
Mr. Villacres graduated from Fordham University in 2010 with a B.A. in Political Science.

This article is available in Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/jcfl/vol19/
iss3/4

VOLUME XIX

2014

NUMBER 3

FORDHAM
JOURNAL OF
CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

BLUE SKIES FOR AMERICA IN THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY . . .
EXCEPT FOR NEW YORK: NEW YORK’S MARTIN ACT AND
THE PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION
Adam J. Gana and Michael Villacres

BLUE SKIES FOR AMERICA IN THE SECURITIES
INDUSTRY . . . EXCEPT FOR NEW YORK:
NEW YORK’S MARTIN ACT AND THE PRIVATE
RIGHT OF ACTION
Adam J. Gana and Michael Villacres1
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION .................................................................................... 587
I. THE ORIGIN AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF NEW YORK’S BLUE
SKY LAW ...................................................................................... 588
II. THE UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT OF 2002 AND OTHER STATES’
BLUE SKY LAWS .......................................................................... 590
III. CHALLENGES FACING NEW YORK INVESTORS ............................ 596
RECOMMENDATION AND CONCLUSION ............................................... 598
INTRODUCTION
New York City is the financial hub of the United States and
according to some, the world.2 Yet, New York is the only state without
a private right of action for violations of state securities laws, and thus
fails to provide its resident investors with the securities protection

1. Adam J. Gana is the managing partner of Gana LLP. His practice focuses on
all aspects of securities arbitration, complex commercial and business litigation,
insurance litigation, employment law, class actions, and appeals. Mr. Gana was named
in the New York Super Lawyers Rising Stars® for four straight years, ranked AV®
Preeminent™ by Martindale-Hubbell™ (the highest honor offered), and ranked by the
National Trial Lawyers as one of the Top 100 attorneys in the State of New York.
Michael Villacres is currently enrolled in New York Law School, Class of 2014, with a
focus on Securities and Corporate Law. Mr. Villacres graduated from Fordham
University in 2010 with a B.A. in Political Science.
2. Richard Florida, What is the World’s Most Economically Powerful City?, THE
ATLANTIC (May 8, 2012, 9:42 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/
2012/05/what-is-the-worlds-most-economically-powerful-city/256841/.
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afforded to residents of other states.3 Blue Sky laws are statutorily
designed to regulate the statewide sale of securities.4 Compared to the
Blue Sky laws of other states, New York’s Martin Act severely5 restricts
New York residents.6
This Article first discusses, in Part I, the origins and legislative
history of the Martin Act in order to explain its purpose. Next, Part II
explores the advantages and disadvantages of the Blue Sky laws of other
states. In light of this exploration, Part III of this Article shows how
New York residents are disadvantaged because they cannot rely on a
statutory private cause of action under the act. Finally, this Article
recommends that to truly protect New York’s investing public, the New
York legislature must either enact a new Blue Sky law or modify the
Martin Act to include a private right of action.
I. THE ORIGIN AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF NEW YORK’S BLUE SKY
LAW
Securities regulations have become a necessity to protect the
increasing number of investors who have become involved in the
marketplace.7 To fund World War I, the federal government began to
sell “securities in the form of Liberty Bonds” to the public.8 While this
introduced many average citizens to the idea of security ownership, it
also exposed investors to early forms of securities fraud.9 Yet, as the
federal government had not enacted any legislation to protect its
citizens, state legislatures were left to act on the matter.10 Thus, states

3. See Stephanie Meyers, Comment, Blue Skies Ahead: Auto Rate Securities and
the Need for Private Right of Action for New York Investors, 30 PACE L. REV. 1109,
1110 (2010).
4. Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Origin of the Blue Sky Laws, 70 TEX.
L. REV. 347, 348–49 (1991).
5. See Meyers, supra note 3.
6. Id.
7. Ambrose V. McCall, Comments on the Martin Act, 3 BROOK. L. REV. 190, 191
(1933).
8. Id.
9. Id. at 192–93. One early type of fraud found was “switching” where a Liberty
bond holder would be induced to give up his/her share which paid 3-4% back annually
for a “practically worthless stock” with a promise of higher earnings. Id.
10. Id. at 193.
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enacted Blue Sky laws to protect investors from dishonest vendors who
“sell shares in the ‘bright blue sky itself.’”11
New York faced the problem of “an enormous population with an
unusually high per capita wealth suddenly made security conscious” that
was prey to dishonest investment practices.12 Thus, on May 7, 1921, the
New York legislature enacted the Martin Act to protect investors from
the fraudulent sale of securities.13 The Martin Act empowers the New
York State Attorney General to regulate and enforce the securities laws
of New York.14 However, there is no express or implied private cause
of action in the text of the Martin Act’s anti-fraud provisions.15 Very
few sources of legislative history look into a private cause of action or
why the legislature might have left it out.16 As such, the New York
courts have ruled that there is no private right of action under the Martin
Act.17
Although there is no private cause of action in the Martin Act, an
individual can still bring a claim under common law fraud in New York
as long as the traditional rules of pleadings and proof are fulfilled.18 In
Assured Guaranty (UK) Ltd. v. J.P. Morgan Investment Management
Inc., the New York Court of Appeals addressed whether the legislature
intended the Martin Act to supplant “non-fraud common law claims.”19
To override common law, there must first be a “clear and specific
legislative intent” to do so.20 The legislature, however, did not expressly
state that the Martin Act would eliminate all other common law claims
that could relate to securities fraud.21 Therefore, the Court of Appeals
11.
12.
13.

Id. at 190.
Id. at 193.
CHARLES MILLS, FRAUDULENT PRACTICES IN RESPECT TO SECURITIES AND
COMMODITIES: WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE MARTIN ACT 291 (W.C. Little & Co.
1925).
14. Gabriel Capital, L.P. v. Natwest Finance, Inc., 137 F. Supp. 2d 251, 266
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (citing N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 352 (McKinney 2014)).
15. CPC Int’l Inc. v. McKesson Corp., 514 N.E.2d 116, 118 (N.Y. 1987).
16. Id. at 122.
17. Id. at 119.
18. Caboara v. Babylon Cove Dev., LLC, 862 N.Y.S.2d 535, 537 (App. Div.
2008).
19. Assured Guar. (UK) Ltd. v. J.P. Morgan Inv. Mgmt. Inc., 962 N.E.2d 765,
767–69 (N.Y. 2011).
20. Id. (citing Hechter v. New York Life Ins. Co., 385 N.E.2d 551, 554 (N.Y.
1978)).
21. Id.
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determined that an investor may “bring a common-law claim (for fraud
or otherwise) that is not entirely dependent on the Martin Act . . . .”22
The court reasoned that allowing both common law fraud actions and
actions brought by the Attorney General under the Martin Act would
further the legislature’s goal of “combating fraud and deception in
securities transactions.”23
However, combating fraud in securities transactions is better met
through simply allowing a private cause of action under the Martin
Act.24 The other forty-nine states have enacted Blue Sky statutes with
private rights of action that make it easier for private litigants to bring
causes of actions to combat securities fraud.25 New York is the lone
exception.
II. THE UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT OF 2002 AND OTHER STATES’ BLUE
SKY LAWS
In 1930, the Uniform Law Commission, a non-profit
unincorporated association,26 introduced the Uniform Sales of Securities
Act of 1930 (“Uniform Securities Act”),27 which was later replaced by
the Uniform Securities Act of 1956 (the “1956 Act”).28 One of the main
reasons for updating the Uniform Securities Act was to standardize state
and federal securities laws.29 The drafters determined that unifying state
and federal laws would streamline the legal system for protecting

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Id. at 770.
Id. at 771.
See infra Parts II and III.
See infra Part II.
About the ULC, UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION, http://www.uniformlaws.org/
Narrative.aspx?title=About%20the%20ULC (last visited Apr. 7, 2014).
27. Securities
Act
Summary,
UNIFORM
LAW
COMMISSION,
http://www.uniformlaws.org/ActSummary.aspx?title=Securities%20Act (last visited
Apr. 7, 2014).
28. Joel Seligman, The New Uniform Securities Act, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 243, 243
(2003); see also UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT OF 1956 §§ 101, 419 (1956), available at
http://www.nasaa.org/wpcontent/uploads/2011/08/UniformSecuritesAct1956withcomm
ents.pdf.
29. Securities
Act
Summary,
UNIFORM
LAW
COMMISSION,
http://www.uniformlaws.org/ActSummary.aspx?title=Securities%20Act.

2014]

BLUE SKIES FOR AMERICA IN
THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY

591

investors.30 The 1956 Act served as a model for many states’ Blue Sky
laws.31 Although the 1956 Act was updated by the Revised Uniform
Securities Act of 1985 (“RUSA”), many states did not adopt RUSA.32
The revised 1956 Act was most recently amended by the Uniform
Securities Act of 2002 (the “2002 Act” and collectively, the “Uniform
Acts”).33 Section 501 of the 2002 Act and § 101 of the 1956 Act were
modeled after § 10b-5 of the federal Securities Exchange Act of 193434
and § 17a35 of the federal Securities Act of 1933.36 Most states have
adopted some version of the Uniform Acts as their Blue Sky law.37
The advantage of following the Uniform Acts is that when there is
ambiguity in a state’s Blue Sky law, courts may defer to cases that have
interpreted the federal securities laws38 because each state requires that
the substantive elements of its law are harmonious to those in the federal
laws.39 To bring a private securities action under § 10b-5, a plaintiff
must prove the following elements:40 “(1) a material misrepresentation
or omission by the defendant; (2) scienter; (3) a connection between the
misrepresentation or omission and the purchase or sale of a security; (4)
reliance upon the misrepresentation or omission; (5) economic loss; and
(6) loss causation.”41
However, the states do not require “exact parallelism with other
states’ and federal law.”42 For example, Minnesota’s Blue Sky Law,
which is based on the 2002 Act, does not require scienter and allows for

30. Cheryl Nichols, The Importance of Selective Federal Preemption in the U.S.
Securities Regulatory Framework: A Lesson from Canada, Our Neighbor to the North,
10 CHAP. L. REV. 391, 470–71 (2006).
31. Id. at 427.
32. See Seligman, supra note 28.
33. Id.
34. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2012).
35. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77q (2012).
36. Merry v. Prestige Capital Mkts., Ltd., 944 F. Supp. 2d 702, 709 (D. Minn.
2013).
37. Nichols, supra note 30.
38. See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77q; Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
15 U.S.C. § 78j.
39. Haberman v. Wash. Pub. Power Supply Sys., 744 P.2d 1032, 1049 (Wash.
1987), amended, 750 P.2d 254 (Wash. 1988).
40. See Seligman, supra note 28; Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans and Trust Funds,
133 S. Ct. 1184, 1191–92 (2013)
41. Id. at 1192.
42. Haberman, 744 P.2d at 1049.
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negligent misrepresentations as a cause of action unlike the federal
laws.43 Similarly, Missouri’s Blue Sky law, also based on the 2002 Act,
does not require scienter to prove securities fraud.44 These states allow
investors who would otherwise be unable to bring a cause of action
under federal law to bring a state law claim.45
While most states have adopted some version of the Uniform Acts,
other states, such as California, Florida, and Texas, have created
divergent Blue Sky laws.46 The California Corporate Securities Law of
1969 (“CCS”) enables investors to establish a securities violation and
recover damages more easily than under the Uniform Acts and 10b-5.47
If not for the CCS, investors in California would not be able to bring
certain causes of action because of the heightened pleading standards of
common law and federal law.48 Under the CCS, privity is required to
prove negligent conduct on the part of the seller but not to prove market
manipulation.49 Additionally, the CCS does not require the plaintiff to
prove reliance or scienter.50 However, even though reliance and scienter
are not necessary to bring the action, the statute is not strict liability
because the defendant may defend himself by:
(1) prov[ing] that he exercised reasonable care and did not know of
the untruth or omission, (2) show[ing] that even if he had exercised

43. See Hardin Cnty. Sav. Bank v. Hous. & Redev. Auth. of the City of Brainerd,
821 N.W.2d 184, 192 (Minn. 2012); see also Merry v. Prestige Capital Mkts., Ltd., 944
F. Supp. 2d 702 (D. Minn. 2013) (“At the pleading stage, a plaintiff asserting liability
under Minn. Stat. § 80A.68(2) must allege: (1) a material misrepresentation or omission
by the defendant; (2) negligence; (3) a connection between the misrepresentation or
omission and the purchase or sale of a security; (4) reliance upon the misrepresentation
or omission; (5) economic loss; and (6) loss causation.”).
44. Meyers, supra note 3, at 1109, 1130.
45. Compare MINN. STAT. § 80A.68(2) (2014), and MINN. STAT. § 80A.40 (2014),
with Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77q (2012), and Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2012).
46. See California Corporate Securities Law, CAL. CORP. CODE § 25000 (2014);
Florida Securities Investor Protection Act, FLA. STAT. § 517 (2014); Texas Securities
Act, TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33 (West 2014).
47. Bowden v. Robinson, 136 Cal. Rptr. 871, 876 (Ct. App. 1977).
48. See California Corporate Securities Law of 1969, CAL. CORP. CODE § 25110
(2014); see also Bowden, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 876–78.
49. California Amplifier, Inc. v. RLI Ins. Co., 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 915, 921 (Ct. App.
2001). When there is evidence of market manipulation privity is not required, but it is
limited to intentional misrepresentations. Id.
50. Id.
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reasonable care, he would not have known of the untruth or
omission, and (3) show[ing] that the plaintiff knew the facts
51
concerning the untruth or omission.

Although the CCS makes it easier for a plaintiff to bring an action,
the California legislature did put in some restrictions.52 One restriction
is monetary: the plaintiff may not recover punitive damages even if the
plaintiff would be able to do so under California common law.53 A
second restriction is the strict statute of limitations of four years after the
violation or one year after the plaintiff realized that there was a
violation, whichever shall expire first.54 The purpose of this limitation is
to prevent the alleged victim from having more time to speculate “at the
expense of innocent parties.”55
Florida’s Blue Sky law is known as the Florida Securities Investor
Protection Act (“FSIPA”).56 The FSIPA, which was once interpreted to
be similar to § 10b-5 because they use similar language, was eventually
distinguished from § 10b-5.57 In Rouseff, the Florida Supreme Court
addressed whether proximate cause was an element of the FSIPA.58 The
court found that FSIPA, which allows that the “scienter requirement . . .
is satisfied by a showing of mere negligence” rather than reckless
disregard, was more analogous to § 12(2) of the 1933 Act.59 Therefore,
this ruling makes it easier for an individual to bring a cause of action
under the FSIPA than under the federal securities laws.
However, like with federal law, a privity requirement must be
fulfilled.60 Unlike § 10b-5, which covers “any person” involved in the
deceitful purchase or sale of a security, the FSIPA is “far more
restrictive” because it applies to a narrower group of activities where

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Bowden, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 878.
See Boam v. Trident Fin. Corp., 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 177, 180 (Ct. App. 1992).
Bowden, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 878.
Id.
Id.
Michael A. Hanzman, Civil Remedies Under the Florida Securities and
Investor Protection Act, 64 FLA. BAR J. 36 (1990), available at
https://www.floridabar.org/divcom/jn/jnjournal01.nsf/Articles/E2981A6F0E0E3B9385
256B1B004C54DF.
57. Id.
58. E. F. Hutton & Co. v. Rousseff, 537 So. 2d 978 (Fla. 1989).
59. In re Checkers Sec. Litig., 858 F. Supp. 1168, 1180 (M.D. Fla. 1994).
60. Id. (citing Rousseff, 537 So. 2d at 981).
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“buyer/seller privity is required.”61 Once privity is shown to exist
between the parties, the FSIPA imposes a standard of “mere negligence”
to bring a cause of action.
The privity element can be detrimental to a plaintiff’s action against
a third party if the plaintiff cannot show privity with that third party.
For instance, in In re Checkers Securities Litigation, the court found
privity and involvement between the seller and buyer but not between
the sellers and the sellers’ auditor KPMG.62 Under the FSIPA, auditors
cannot be held liable when they merely provided “professional services
and had no financial interest in the sale of the securities.”63 Therefore,
because these two elements were not present, KPMG was not liable.64
The FSIPA also includes an attorney fee-shifting provision that
further distinguishes it from federal law and other state statutes.65 A feeshifting provision requires the losing party to bear the reasonable
attorney’s fees of the other side.66 The FSIPA fee-shifting provision
states:
[t]he court shall grant reasonable compensation for services rendered
and reimbursement for proper costs and expenses incurred . . . by a
trustee, and by the attorney for such trustee, in connection with a
67
liquidation proceeding.

Fee-shifting provisions can be a blessing and a curse for investors.
Such provisions encourage investors to bring only the most meritorious
cases and discourage investors from bringing cases that are not clear
winners.68
Fee-shifting provisions also change the dynamic of

61.
62.
63.

Hanzman, supra note 56.
In re Checkers, 858 F. Supp. at 1180.
Id. (citing Moore v. Kayport Package Express, Inc., 885 F.2d 531, 535–37 (9th
Cir. 1989)).
64. See id. at 1180–81.
65. HENRY COHEN, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS: AWARDS FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES
BY FEDERAL COURTS AND FEDERAL AGENCIES 75 (2008), available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/94-970.pdf.
66. Thomas D. Rowe Jr., The Legal Theory of Attorney Fee Shifting: A Critical
Overview, 1982 DUKE L.J. 651 (1982).
67. COHEN, supra note 65 (quoting Securities Investor Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §
78eee(b)(5)(A) (2012)).
68. Rowe, supra note 66, at 652.
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settlement negotiations69 by encouraging parties to negotiate earlier and
more often.
Texas’s Blue Sky law, the Texas Securities Act (“TSA”), is also
unique.70 The main purpose of the TSA is to “facilitate investors’
actions to recover their monies through a simplified fraud action . . . .”71
Like the CCS and FSIPA, the TSA provides investors with an
alternative route to bring causes of actions that differ from common or
federal law.72 Unlike Texas’s common law fraud claims, the TSA does
not require privity or scienter.73 In addition, the TSA requires neither
reliance on the seller’s material misrepresentation or omission nor any
due diligence on the part of the buyer.74 Like the CCS, when parts of
the TSA are found to be similar to federal law, Texas courts may turn to
cases that interpret federal law for guidance on novel issues, but do not
necessarily find such federal law interpretations dispositive.75
However, unlike the CCS and the FSIPA, the TSA requires
heightened pleading for claims against aiders and abettors of securities
fraud.76 To establish liability against an aider and abettor of securities
fraud, a plaintiff must show:
(1) the existence of a primary violation of the securities laws, (2) that
the aider has a general awareness of its role in the violation, (3) that
the aider gave substantial assistance in the violation, and (4) that the
aider intended to deceive the plaintiff or acted with reckless
disregard for the truth of the representations made by the primary
77
violator.

This pleading standard is higher than where the plaintiff asserts
liability against the person directly responsible for the fraud. For
69. Nicholas N. Nierengarten, Fee Shifting: The Recovery of In-House Legal Fees,
39 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 227, 229 (2012).
70. See Keith Rowley, The Sky Is Still Blue in Texas: State Law Alternatives to
Federal Securities Remedies, 50 BAYLOR L. REV. 99, 104 (1998).
71. George Lee Flint Jr., Securities Regulation, 61 SMU L. REV. 1107, 1119
(2008).
72. See id.
73. See id.
74. See Granader v. McBee, 23 F.3d 120, 123 (5th Cir. 1994).
75. See, e.g., In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 235 F. Supp. 2d
549, 567 (S.D. Tex. 2002).
76. See id. at 568 (citing Frank v. Bear, Stearns, & Co., 11 S.W.3d 380, 384 (Tex.
App. 2000)).
77. Id.
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instance, the Texas Appellate Court held that where lawyers merely
prepare the transactional documents for the perpetrator of the fraud
without the requisite scienter, there is no aiding and abetting liability.78
Still, whether modeled on the Uniform Acts or not, all of the Blue
Sky laws of the forty-nine states share the goal of aiding investor
protection.79 To achieve this, all states but New York recognize a
private cause of action for securities fraud in violation of their respective
Blue Sky laws.80 If the New York legislature truly seeks to protect
investors, as it did when it created the Martin Act,81 then it must modify
its law to include a private right of action for Martin Act violations.
III. CHALLENGES FACING NEW YORK INVESTORS
A New York investor can raise a private cause of action only
through common law fraud, as opposed to state statutory violations.
The elements for common law fraud in New York are: “1)
[r]epresentations, 2) [f]alsity, 3) [s]cienter . . .; 4) [d]eception of the
party to whom made; and 5) [i]njury due to justified reliance on the
misrepresentation.”82 However, the Attorney General “need not allege
or prove either scienter or intentional fraud” to bring a civil enforcement
proceeding under the Martin Act.83 This advantage is exclusively given
to the New York Attorney General.84

78.
79.

Kastner v. Jenkens & Gilchrist, P.C., 231 S.W.3d 571, 578 (Tex. App. 2007).
See, e.g., State v. McGuire, 735 N.W.2d 555, 561 (Wis. Ct. App. 2007)
(“Because the entire purpose of “blue sky” laws is to protect investors, the law must be
liberally construed to carry out that plain legislative intent.”); Sperry & Hutchinson Co.
v. Hudson, 226 P.2d 501, 504 (Or. 1951) (“The Blue Sky Law was enacted for the
protection of the public[.]”); Hanzman, supra note 56 (“[E]ngrafting a scienter or
reliance element onto §517.211 would, in the author’s opinion, run counter to . . . the
Supreme Court’s admonition that the act be given a broad and liberal interpretation to
effectuate its purpose of protecting the public . . . .”).
80. See CPC Int’l Inc. v. McKesson Corp., 514 N.E.2d 116, 118 (N.Y. 1987) (“In
all the other States, except one, the Legislature has expressly recognized a private civil
action for violations of the corresponding provision. Under the Martin Act, however, no
private action has been expressly authorized.”).
81. McCall, supra note 7, at 195 (internal quotation marks omitted).
82. Meyers, supra note 3, at 1126.
83. Assured Guar. (UK) Ltd. v. J.P. Morgan Inv. Mgmt. Inc., 962 N.E.2d 765, 768
(N.Y. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted).
84. Meyers, supra note 3, at 1124.
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When compared to the Blue Sky laws of other states, like Florida,
where “mere negligence” is sufficient to state a cause of action, New
Yorkers are clearly at a disadvantage.85 The most glaring disadvantage
for investors in bringing claims under New York’s common law fraud is
that they cannot easily bring claims for fraudulent omissions. New York
plaintiffs must show that “the defendant knowingly uttered a falsehood
intending to deprive the plaintiff of a benefit and that the plaintiff was
thereby deceived and damaged.”86 Omission claims may be preempted
if the plaintiff shows “active concealment unrelated to omissions from
Martin Act disclosures.”87 Under the CCS or FSIPA, New Yorkers
could more easily plead claims of omissions. For example, in Ashland
Inc., a federal New York case, the defendant, Morgan Stanley, was
accused of making false and misleading statements and material
omissions to get Ashland Inc. to purchase student loan auction rate
securities (“ARSs”).88 Morgan Stanley allegedly urged Ashland to
continue purchasing ARSs even though Morgan Stanley knew that the
market for those securities was collapsing.89 However, the court found
that Ashland failed to state a claim of fraud under New York common
law due to insufficient pleadings of scienter and reliance.90 Had this
case been brought in California or Florida, though, Ashland would have
been better able to plead its case because in those states: (1) the pleading
standards are lower; (2) an omission can be the basis for a claim of
fraud; and (3) reliance is not a necessary element to plead securities
fraud.91 Thus, while the Martin Act was a novel initiative when it was
85. In re Checkers Sec. Litig., 858 F. Supp. 1168, 1180 (M.D. Fla. 1994) (“The . . .
scienter requirement under Florida law is satisfied by a showing of mere negligence,
whereas the minimum showing under Rule 10b–5 is reckless disregard.”). Cf. Meyers,
supra note 3, at 1126.
86. Channel Master Corp. v. Aluminum Ltd. Sales, Inc., 151 N.E.2d 833, 835
(N.Y. 1958).
87. Kerusa Co. v. W107/515 Real Estate P’ship, 12 N.Y.3d 236, 246 (2009).
88. Ashland Inc. v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 700 F. Supp. 2d 453, 457 (S.D.N.Y.
2010), aff’d, 652 F.3d 333 (2d Cir. 2011).
89. Id.
90. Id. at 471–72.
91. Mirkin v. Wasserman, 858 P.2d 568, 580 (Cal. 1993) (“There is no requirement
under these sections that the plaintiff rely upon the statements or acts of the defendant
or even that he be aware that the defendant made them or engaged in them. All that is
required is that the plaintiff establish that the price which he paid or received was
affected by the defendant’s conduct or statements, which would of course assume that
someone acted on the basis of the defendant’s wrongful conduct. However, it is not
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first introduced, it has since become outdated and limits New York
investors in seeking remedies for securities fraud.
RECOMMENDATION AND CONCLUSION
As the current state of the Martin Act fails to adequately protect
investors in New York, the New York legislature should adopt a new
security law similar to the Blue Sky laws in California or Florida.92 A
law based on the Uniform Acts, thought to be superior to the Martin
Act, might be disadvantageous because as stated earlier, any ambiguity
found in the statute may lead the courts to defer to the higher standard of
federal law.93 At the very least, the legislature should amend the Martin
Act to include a private right of action so that defrauded investors could
more easily recover for their wrongful losses.94 There appears to be no
legitimate reason for investors in New York to continue being
disadvantaged compared to those in the rest of the United States. The
only reason that the courts give for this discrepancy is that a private
right of action is inconsistent with “the legislative scheme underlying
the Martin Act.”95 If anything, given that New York is the center of the
securities industry,96 investors in New York should have greater
protection from fraudulent practices in the industry because of the
increased likelihood of such fraud to occur.97 It is time for the New
York legislature to further its Blue Sky law for the benefit of its
residents.

necessary that the plaintiff prove that he personally was influenced by such conduct.”)
(citing 1 MARSH & VOLK, Practice Under the Cal. Securities Law § 14.05[6], at 14–53
(1993) (footnote omitted)); see also, People v. Simon, 886 P.2d 1271, 1281 (Cal. 1995)
(“[T]he California Legislature intended section 25401 to apply to any willful conduct
and did not make knowledge of the falsity of a statement an element of the offense.”).
92. See infra Part III.
93. See infra Part II.
94. See Meyers, supra note 3.
95. CPC Int’l Inc. v. McKesson Corp., 514 N.E.2d 116, 119 (N.Y. 1987).
96. See Florida, supra note 2.
97. See McCall, supra note 7.

